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Analysis of Evidence in International Criminal Trials Using Bayesian Belief 
Networks 
Yvonne McDermott* and Colin Aitken** 
As with trials in any other jurisdiction, trials of those charged with the most serious 
international crimes – namely genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes1 – 
before international criminal courts involve the creation and analysis of legal 
arguments, where hypotheses and the evidence supporting those hypotheses are 
presented to the court. What sets the international criminal trial apart is the 
challenging evidentiary environment in which these arguments are presented. 
Typically, trials take place in a location that is geographically distant from where the 
incidents under examination took place. 2  A degree of temporal distance is also 
common, with some trials taking place up to 40 years after the events in question.3 In 
addition, many international criminal tribunals rely heavily on witness testimony, and 
problems with such witnesses’ accounts (which might be attributed to trauma, lost 
memory with the passage of time, interference, or ulterior motives) have been well 
documented.4  The volume of evidence and breadth of the charges presented also 
creates some unique challenges.5 
 
In spite of these difficulties, the processes of fact-finding by international criminal 
tribunals have traditionally received relatively little attention. The tribunals’ common 
                                                        
* Associate Professor of Law, College of Law and Criminology, Swansea University, UK. Email 
Yvonne.McDermottRees@swansea.ac.uk. I am grateful to the British Academy for a Quantitative 
Skills Acquisition Award, which enabled earlier parts of this research. 
** Professor of Forensic Statistics, School of Mathematics, University of Edinburgh, UK. 
1 Some international criminal tribunals, such as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), have or had jurisdiction over domestic crimes, while the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) will likely have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in the future. 
2 The ICC and STL are located in The Hague, as is International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is located in Arusha, 
Tanzania.  
3 The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is currently trying defendants for 
their role in the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 to 1979. The ICTR has conducted trials for the 
genocide in Rwanda and related atrocities up to 20 years after the events in question. The ICTY has 
tried individuals for crimes up to 20 years after their alleged commission, and up to 10 years between 
the atrocities had passed before individuals were put on trial by SCSL.  
4 Nancy Combs, Fact-Finding without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of International 
Criminal Convictions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).  
5  For example, the trial record in Prlić et al. extended beyond one million pages: Prosecutor v. 
Judgment, Case No. IT-04-74-T, Trial Chamber III, 29 May 2013. See further, Yvonne McDermott, 
‘Inferential Reasoning and Proof in International Criminal Trials: The Potentials of Wigmorean 
Analysis’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 507. 
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assertion that judgments are based ‘on the totality of the evidence’, and that, even 
where particular pieces of evidence have not been explicitly referenced, they have 
been taken into account,6 were accepted as a reflection of the intuitive exercise of 
fact-finding. More recently, however, researchers have begun to examine the 
processes of proof, 7  either by advocating more formalistic methods for charting 
arguments, such as Wigmorean analysis,8 or dissecting concepts such as ‘robustness’ 
or Keynesian weight in the context of the international criminal trial.9 
 
With the exception of two notable authors in this field, however, no international 
criminal law scholarship has yet examined the possibility of applying Bayesian 
probability theory to international criminal trials. Mark Klamberg nests a brief 
discussion of Bayes’ theorem under a broader exposition of mathematical 
(‘Pascalian’) approaches,10 noting that these approaches can be seen as ‘methods of 
evaluation [which] may provide a check against the judge’s intuition’.11 Simon De 
Smet, in his discussion of diverse methods for formalising fact-finding, includes 
Bayesian analysis amongst those methods, and notes that the Bayesian approach 
brings with it the advantages of enhanced rigour and transparency.12 However, these 
relatively brief accounts have not provided any practical examples of how Bayesian 
probability theory could be applied in practice.  
 
By contrast, this piece seeks to advocate the use of Bayesian Networks (‘Bayes 
Nets’), which are graphical models of the probabilistic relationships between 
                                                        
6 Amongst many others, see Prosecutor v. Đorđević, Judgment, Case No. IT-05-87/1-T, 23 February 
2011, para 18; Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., Judgment, Case No. ICTR-98-42-T, 24 June 2011, 
para 190; Prosecutor v. Perišić, Judgment, Case No. IT-04-81-T, 6 September 2011, para 41.  
7 Two symposium issues have recently been co-edited by John D. Jackson and Yvonne McDermott: 
‘Proof in International Criminal Trials’ in (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 475-624, 
and ‘Evidence and Proof in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’ (2015) 26 Criminal Law 
Forum 347-418. 
8 Paul Roberts, ‘The Priority of Procedure and the Neglect of Evidence and Proof: Facing Facts in 
International Criminal Law’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 479; McDermott (n 
5); Terence Anderson and William Twining, ‘Evidential Reasoning in the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda: a Case Study of Tharcisse Muvunyi’ (2015) 26 Criminal Law Forum 373.  
9  Mark Klamberg, ‘The Alternative Hypothesis Approach, Robustness and International Criminal 
Justice: A Plea for a ‘Combined Approach’ to Evaluation of Evidence’ (2015) 13 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 535.  
10  Mark Klamberg, Evidence in International Criminal Trials: Confronting Legal Gaps and the 
Reconstruction of Disputed Events (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2013) 161-164.  
11 Id. 159. 
12 Simon De Smet,‘The International Criminal Standard of Proof at the International Criminal Court – 
Beyond Reasonable Doubt or Beyond Reason?’ in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 861, 873. 
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hypotheses and pieces of evidence,13 as being a potentially useful tool in both the 
examination of international criminal judgments and the processes of trial preparation 
and fact-finding before international criminal tribunals. We illustrate this point with a 
practical case study based on a completed case from the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Part I discusses how different actors in 
international criminal trials could use the method to enhance their practice, and 
defends against some possible criticisms that may arise against the use of Bayes Nets 
in this context. Part II demonstrates the potential applicability of Bayes Nets to 
international criminal trials with the aid of a case study from a completed trial before 
the ICTY. It is our firm belief that both an understanding of the principles 
underpinning Bayes Nets, and a utilisation of the method in practice, have the 
potential to strengthen judges’ confidence in their findings, to assist lawyers in 
preparing for trial, and to provide a tool for the assessment of international criminal 
tribunals’ factual findings.  
 
This discussion is timely, not just because it fits with a wider focus on judicial 
decision-making and the need for rigour in reasoning that has emerged in the specific 
field of international criminal law in recent years. 14  The method could also be 
extended across a range of legal disciplines that deal with complex fact-finding issues, 
and to other complex areas of law, such as fraud trials, other serious crimes, and civil 
litigation, and our illustration highlights the practicability of applying Bayes Nets to 
real cases. Recent research has highlighted the need to move beyond misconceptions 
about Bayes’ theorem and the resistance to Bayesian methods amongst the legal 
community more generally.15 This article, by providing a clear illustration of how 
Bayes Nets could be used in such complex trials as those before international criminal 
tribunals, represents a step in that direction.  
 
                                                        
13 Norman Fenton, David Lagnado and Martin Neil, ‘A General Structure for Legal Arguments Using 
Bayesian Networks’ (2013) 37 Cognitive Science 61, available online at 
https://www.eecs.qmul.ac.uk/~norman/papers/legal_arguments_final_submitted.pdf, 40.  
14 As well as those cited above, notes 3-11, see e.g. Marjolein Cupido, Facts Matter: A Study into the 
Casuistry of Substantive International Criminal Law (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 
2015).  
15 Norman Fenton, Martin Neil and Daniel Berger, ‘Bayes and the Law’ (2016) 3 Annual Review of 
Statistics and Its Application, available online at 
http://www.eecs.qmul.ac.uk/~norman/papers/bayes_and_the_law_revised_FINAL.pdf.  
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I. Applying Bayes Nets to International Criminal Trials  
Readers of this journal will already be familiar with the fundamentals of Bayesian 
probability theory and the role of Bayes Nets in calculating probabilities in a complex 
system.16 The method of constructing Bayes Nets to automate probability calculations 
has been applied to such diverse fields of inquiry as DNA inclusion, 17  speaker 
recognition systems,18 and traffic accident reconstructions.19 
 
It is our argument that, in the context of the international criminal trial, judges could 
benefit from both the tool, and an understanding of the principles of probability 
underpinning Bayes Nets. Given the volume of the evidential record in these trials, 
Bayes Nets could enable judges to calculate probabilities in a manner that would be 
impossible on a straightforward reading of the trial record. International criminal 
judgments are particularly suited to this type of scholarly analysis, given the volume 
of reasoned opinion derivable from judgments – it is not uncommon for judgments to 
exceed several hundred pages, outlining the factual background to the crimes charged, 
the elements of each crime, and the reasons why the mixed mass of evidence 
presented before the Trial Chamber either convinces it of the guilt of the accused or 
fails to reach the required standard of proof.20 This amount of available information 
enables probabilities to be more informed. In addition, the trial records of these cases 
are freely available online, enabling the observer to use information from the trial 
record to calculate probabilities, as we have done below. 
 
It has been noted elsewhere that the standard of proof in international criminal trials 
has not been adequately enunciated, and there does seem to be a difference in the 
understanding of what the standard entails between differently-constituted Chambers 
                                                        
16  For a general introduction, see Philip Dawid, David Schum and Amanda Hepler, ‘Inference 
Networks: Bayes and Wigmore’ in Philip Dawid, William Twining and Mimi Vasilaki (eds.), 
Evidence, Inference and Inquiry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 119.  
17 Alex Biedermann, Franco Taroni, and William C. Thompson, ‘Using Graphical Probability Analysis 
(Bayes Nets) to Evaluate a Conditional DNA Inclusion’ (2011) 10 Law, Probability and Risk 89.  
18 Jose Juan Lucena-Molina, Marina Gascon-Abillan, and Virginia Pardo-Iranzo, ‘Technical Support 
for a Judge when Assessing A Priori Odds’ (2015) 14 Law, Probability and Risk 147. 
19 Gary A. Davis, ‘Bayesian Reconstruction of Traffic Accidents’ (2003) 2 Law, Probability and Risk 
69.  
20 For example, the 24 March 2016 trial judgment in Prosecutor v. Karadžić (Case No. IT-95-5/18-T) 
totaled over 2500 pages. 
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of the same tribunals.21 Perhaps the best example of this comes from the Ngudjolo 
Appeals Chamber judgment before the ICC, where the two dissenting judges 
considered that the majority had taken an ‘excessively fragmentary’ approach to the 
evidence, in considering each piece of evidence on its own merits, instead of looking 
at the evidence as a whole.22 The Prosecutor, in her appeal, had complained that proof 
beyond reasonable doubt ‘does not require proof beyond any doubt and does not 
require the Chamber to search for and then reject all hypothetically possible contrary 
inferences, however unrealistic or unsupported’, and that the Trial Chamber had 
exceeded the ‘reasonable doubt’ standard in its judgment. The dissenting Appeals 
Chamber judges appeared to concur, finding that, if all of the evidence as a whole was 
taken together, this ‘might have sufficed for the Trial Chamber to establish Mr 
Ngudjolo’s control over the Lendu militia of the Bedu-Ezekere groupement at the 
relevant time.’23 This appears to highlight not only the apparent difference in opinion 
between judges as to what level of certainty is needed to satisfy the ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ standard, but also the potential benefits of Bayes Nets in this 
context, given that they enable the judge to determine the effect of each subsequent 
piece of evidence on the odds of guilt. If a greater understanding of probability were 
more widespread, it may give rise to a much-needed debate in international criminal 
law on the precise percentage of confidence in a finding that is required to meet the 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard.24  
 
Arguably, this debate is even more necessary in international criminal tribunals than 
in domestic trials, as the international tribunals incorporate different standards of 
proof for different stages of proceedings. It would be valuable to attempt to quantify 
                                                        
21 De Smet (n 12), 871; Yvonne McDermott, ‘The ICTR’s Fact-Finding Legacy: Lessons for the Future 
of Proof in International Criminal Trials’ (2015) 26 Criminal Law Forum 351. 
22 Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova and Judge Cuno Tarfusser, Judgment on 
the Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Decision of Trial Chamber II entitled ‘Judgment Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute’, Chui (ICC-01/04-02/12-271-AnxA), Appeals Chamber, 7 April 2015, paras 
44-51.  
23 Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Trendafilova and Tarfusser, ibid., para 46. 
24 This is a debate that has been well-rehearsed amongst criminal law scholars in the United Kingdom 
and United States of America: see e.g. Jon O. Newman, ‘Quantifying the Standard of Proof Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt: A Comment on Three Comments’ (2006) 5 Law, Probability and Risk 267, and 
Peter Tillers and Jonathan Gottfried, ‘Case Comment: United States v. Copeland 369 F. Supp. 2d 275 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005): A Collateral Attack on the Legal Maxim That Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt is 
Unquantifiable?’ (2006) 5 Law, Probability and Risk 135.  
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the level of confidence required for the standards of ‘reasonable grounds to believe’,25 
‘substantial grounds to believe’, 26  and ‘no case to answer’, 27  as well as ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’. Again, the jurisprudence from the International Criminal Court 
highlights a marked difference of opinion between judges on the level of certainty 
required to reach the requisite standard of proof for each of these stages of 
proceedings. 28  This assumption that an understanding of the basics of Bayesian 
probability would help judges to articulate their differing opinions in this regard, and 
to reach a mutually agreeable conclusion, is perhaps over-optimistic.  However, it is 
clear from several well-publicised failures to understand conditional probability29 that 
there are considerable benefits to be had in the administration of criminal justice from 
a greater understanding in this regard. 
 
As well as enabling judges to quantify the precise level of confidence required to 
meet the standard of proof, the use of Bayes Nets would enable them to challenge 
their own impressionistic analyses of the evidence at hand, and determine whether 
that evidence was sufficient to meet the standard of proof. By committing to estimates 
of uncertainty (either subjective or objective, numerical or verbal) for each piece of 
evidence as part of the reasoning process, the exercise of creating a Bayes Net forces 
the decision-maker to confront the strength of their confidence in their conclusions. 
Once again, it is emphasised that the creation of Bayes Nets is a method, first, for the 
illustration of the associations amongst items of evidence and propositions, and the 
strength of these associations and, second, for the calculation of the probability of a 
proposition in light of the evidence at hand; the construction of a network is not a 
substitute for judicial reasoning, nor should it be. The exercises of determining which 
events are conditional upon one another and allocating appropriate conditional 
probabilities are fundamentally the task for the decision-maker and, whilst new 
                                                        
25 Article 58(1), ICC Statute. For an in-depth discussion, see Michael Ramsden and Cecilia Chung, 
‘“Reasonable Grounds to Believe”: An Unreasonably Unclear Evidentiary Threshold in the ICC 
Statute’ (2015) 13 Journal of International Criminal Justice 555. 
26 Article 61(7), ICC Statute; see further, Klamberg (n 10), 147; Triestino Mariniello, ‘Questioning the 
Standard of Proof: The Purpose of the ICC Confirmation of Charges Procedure’ (2015) 13 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 579.  
27 Rule 98bis, ICTY and ICTR RPE; Rule 98, SCSL RPE; Rule 167, STL RPE. 
28 See, as a recent example, the separate opinion of Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut in Decision on 
the confirmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen, Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15-422), Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, 23 March 2016. 
29 See, for example, R v. Clark, 2003, EWCA Crim 1020, 2003, All ER (D) 223 
(Apr),CA and 2000, All ER (D) 1219, CA. 
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technology can assist with the calculations, neither Bayes’ theorem nor Bayes Nets 
can act as a replacement to the subjective human exercise of reasoning.  
 
Judges in the ICC, and other international criminal tribunals, have to reach a decision 
based on thousands of pieces of evidence with countless interactions amongst these 
items. The construction of a Bayes Net for the totality of evidence enables these 
interactions to be represented as a set of small numbers of interactions, as exemplified 
in Figure 2 below. In Figure 2, the largest number of conditioning events for which 
assessments of conditional probabilities have to be made is two. With a Bayes Net 
consisting of a large number of nodes, careful construction can enable the structure to 
be such that conditional probabilities never need to be evaluated for more than a few 
(hopefully three) conditioning events. These assessments can be made with much 
greater assurance than any attempt to consider the totality of evidence simultaneously 
would achieve. The evaluation of evidence for the whole network (totality of 
evidence) can then be determined with propagation of the evidence through the 
network using an appropriate software programme, such as Genie, as was used here. 
 
For lawyers, Bayes Nets may also prove useful as a trial preparation tool or as part of 
a summary at the conclusion of a trial. The creation of Bayes Nets allow lawyers on 
both sides to assess the sufficiency of their evidence in proving their case, and to 
address gaps in the robustness of that evidence, where possible. In contrast to other 
means for the graphical representation of evidence, such as Wigmore charts, Bayes 
Nets include measures of uncertainty. As Roberts and Aitken have previously noted, 
Bayes Nets ‘encourage and facilitate consideration of alternative possibilities, 
employing different conditional dependencies or registering their absence. This 
should ideally promote refinement of initial hypotheses and more transparent and 
productive discussion of inferential reasoning. Disagreements (reflecting divergent 
standpoints or premises) may well persist, but are now challenged to meet more 
exacting standards of rational justification. The heuristic power of Bayes Nets, in 
rendering subjective assumptions and intuitions articulate, is rigorously logical and 
objective.’ 30  Furthermore, a good knowledge of common pitfalls in probabilistic 
                                                        
30 Paul Roberts and Colin Aitken, The Logic of Forensic Proof: Inferential Reasoning in Criminal 
Evidence and Forensic Science Guidance for Judges, Lawyers, Forensic Scientists and Expert 
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reasoning (such as the well-known ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’) will be an invaluable asset 
to lawyers working on appeals where such fallacies in reasoning or the presentation of 
statistics have seemingly occurred.31  
 
Lastly, in the light of a growing amount of literature pointing to deficiencies in fact-
finding before certain international criminal tribunals,32 the method may also be of 
interest to academics and other observers of international criminal trials. This is not to 
suggest that academics or other interested parties will be able to prove that a 
particular finding of fact was incorrect by applying Bayes’ theorem to this finding, 
given that each individual’s assumptions and beliefs will be different. However, it 
does enable the observer to attempt to identify the evidential bases for a finding, 
where that is frequently opaque or ambiguous,33 and model them probabilistically.  
We are conscious that, as with other analytical techniques, Bayes Nets may be 
dismissed as being either inappropriate or impossible in the context of international 
criminal trials. Indeed, in domestic criminal law and scholarship, Bayesianism and 
other mathematical approaches to proof have met with some scepticism.34 Some of 
the potential criticisms that may arise are worthy of a more in-depth analysis. 
First, some may argue that Bayesian approaches give the impression of mathematical 
precision, while they are as imprecise as narrative or intuitive approaches to proof. 
Yet, Bayesianism does not claim to ‘fix’ the problems of subjectivity inherent in such 
approaches; rather, Bayes Nets are tools that allow decision-makers to put numerical 
values on a range of compounded probabilities and perhaps delve into a deeper 
examination of those initial intuitions. To dismiss Bayes Nets as irrelevant owing to 
                                                                                                                                                              
Witnesses, Royal Statistical Society Practitioner Guide No. 3 (2014), available online at 
http://www.rss.org.uk/statsandlaw(last visited 3 May 2017), 126. 
31 One of the best-known examples of the prosecutor’s fallacy in practice is the wrongful conviction of 
Sally Clark for the murder of her children, where the expert witness wrongly claimed that there was a 
probability of 1 in 73 million of the assignation of two deaths to sudden infant death syndrome in the 
same family; see further, Royal Statistical Society, ‘Letter from the President to the Lord Chancellor 
regarding the use of statistical evidence in court cases’ (23 January 2002), available online at: 
http://www.rss.org.uk/Images/PDF/influencing-change/rss-use-statistical-evidence-court-cases-
2002.pdf.  
32 Combs (n 4); Alexander Zahar, ‘Pluralism and the Rights of the Accused in International Criminal 
Proceedings’ in Elies van Sliedregt and Sergey Vasiliev (eds.), Pluralism in International Criminal 
Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014) 225, 240.  
33 Cupido (n 14). 
34 Perhaps most notably, L. Jonathan Cohen, The Probable and the Provable (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1977). 
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their inevitable limitations would be akin to throwing the baby out with the bathwater. 
The fact remains that reasoning in (international) criminal trials is inherently 
probabilistic, and the international criminal tribunals have evidenced some 
understanding of the idea of conditional probabilities and their application to 
international criminal trials in their judgments. In Milutinović, for example, the 
ICTY’s Trial Chamber noted that evidence ‘is relevant if it tends to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of an issue in a case 
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’35  
 
A related argument may be raised that even if probability is mathematical in 
principle,36 it is difficult to measure in the context of a criminal trial because of an 
absence of statistics and the difficulty in determining its subjective equivalent as a 
measure of belief.37 It should be clarified that the method is not only suitable for those 
cases where the probability of a particular piece of evidence can be independently 
scientifically verified, as with a DNA profile. The method can also be used when 
subjective probabilities are involved. This may be seen as a somewhat unscientific 
application of a scientific method, but of course where a judge or juror has to consider 
issues such as the fact that the defendant fled as part of their deliberations, they must 
assess what that specific piece of information tells them about the likelihood of an 
outcome. The application of the language of mathematics simply helps the decision-
maker to clarify the measure of belief that attaches to a particular intuition, and it 
would do such decision-makers a disservice to exclude subjective probabilities from 
the application of Bayes’ theorem.38  
Further, some may argue that Bayes Nets are beyond the limits of lawyers’ capacities. 
Lempert has pointed out that people are not natural statisticians, and cannot be 
expected to come up with probabilities for outcomes that are objectively incapable of 
measurement.39 There is a school of thought that ‘to introduce Bayes Theorem, or any 
similar method, into a criminal trial plunges the jury [or judge] into inappropriate and 
                                                        
35 Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-05-87-T, 26 February 2009, para 36.  
36 Cf. Cohen (n 34), arguing that some probability judgments could be reached and analysed on the 
basis of non-mathematical (‘Baconian’) criteria. 
37 Klamberg (n 10), 163. 
38 Richard O. Lempert, Samuel R. Gross & James S. Liebman, A Modern Approach to Evidence (3rd 
edn., St. Paul, MN: West Group Publishing, 2000) 228-232.  
39 Richard Lempert, ‘The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Processes of Proof’ (1986) 66 
Boston University Law Review 439, 444-446.  
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unnecessary realms of theory and complexity deflecting them from their proper 
task.’40 Psychological research, however, has pointed out that humans may well be 
intuitive statisticians,41 which calls this assumption into question. Indeed, in our day-
to-day lives, we all use phrases like ‘I am quite certain’; ‘I am not sure’ and ‘I am 
positive’, each of which highlight an innate ability to differentiate between distinct 
levels of certainties. Even those without any mathematical training will understand 
basic concepts of probability, such as if A is probable and B is very probable, the 
probability of both occurring is less than the probability of A alone.42 Even if we were 
to accept that peoples’ capacity to reason on probabilistic matters is necessarily 
limited, this would arguably provide a greater reason to encourage the use of more 
formalistic methods, rather than leaving such matters to their intuitive impressions or 
guesswork.43 An illustration of a well-known principle of Bayes Theorem is given by 
David Eddy: 
The probability that a woman at age 40 has breast cancer is 1%. According to 
the literature, the probability that the disease is detected by a mammography is 
80%. The probability that the test misdetects the disease although the patient 
does not have it is 9.6%. If a woman at age 40 is tested as positive, what is the 
probability that she indeed has breast cancer?44 
Eddy reported that 95 out of 100 doctors estimated this probability to be between 70% 
and 80%, whereas the correct answer (following Bayes’ theorem) is much lower, at 
under 8%. Assuming that this does illustrate a broader difficulty with probabilistic 
reasoning that presumably extends to the legal profession as well, is that not all the 
more reason to encourage a more formalistic approach to probabilities, by applying 
the theorem in practice? 
Further, by today, a number of software programmes, including Hugin™, 
AgenaRisk™, and GeNIe™,45 are available to do the calculations. The use of the 
                                                        
40 R v. Adams [1998] 1 Cr App R 377. 
41 Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, ‘Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all? Rethinking some 
conclusions from the literature on judgment under uncertainty’ (1996) 58 Cognition 1. 
42 Glanville Williams, ‘The Mathematics of Proof - I’ [1979] Criminal Law Review 279. Compare 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, ‘Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction 
Fallacy in Probability Judgment’ (1983) 90 Psychological Review 293. 
43 Ibid., 299. 
44 David M. Eddy, ‘Probabilistic Reasoning in Clinical Medicine: Problems and Opportunities’ in 
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 249. 
45  Hugin Expert, available online at http://www.hugin.com; AgenaRisk, available online at: 
http://www.agenarisk.com; GeNIe, available online at http://www.bayesfusion.com/.  
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GeNIe software for analysing a Bayesian network is demonstrated in the case study 
below. Evidence can be taken into account (a process known as ‘instantiation’) and 
the Bayes Net software calculates (a process known as ‘propagation’) the updated 
posterior probabilities from which the posterior odds and hence the likelihood ratio 
may be calculated. In this sense, these technologies not only apply a logical 
mathematical method to determine revised probability determinations; they also help 
us ‘to visualize the causal relationships between different hypotheses and pieces of 
evidence in a complex legal argument’.46 The beauty of the network and the theory 
for updating probabilities is that correct transposed conditional probabilities may be 
calculated. 
A further possible criticism of mathematical approaches is that they create 
uncertainty. Consider the following example of the confusion that may arise if 
probabilities of guilt are determined for two pieces of evidence E1 and E2. Let Hp 
denote the proposition that the suspect is guilty. For both E1 and E2, suppose the 
court determines Pr(Hp | E1) and Pr(Hp | E2) to be 0.7. On a balance of probabilities, 
E1 and E2, separately, imply the guilt of the suspect. The court then multiplies these 
together, a multiplication which assumes some sort of independence, to produce a 
probability of 0.72 = 0.49. This last probability is less than 0.5. Superficially, this 
seems to imply that two pieces of evidence, which separately imply the guilt of the 
suspect, when combined imply the innocence of the suspect. This apparent 
contradiction is part of the basis of the criticism by Cohen of the relevance of the 
calculations of standard probability (Cohen’s term is Pascalian).47 However, Dawid 
explained how a rigorous Bayesian analysis is able to counter this criticism.48 By 
applying Bayes’ theorem, Dawid demonstrates how the combined probability of guilt 
in light of the two pieces of evidence is in fact 0.84, which of course is greater than 
the probability of each of the individual pieces of evidence.49 
The final potential criticism that may be raised is that the method is inappropriate in 
the context of the international criminal trial because the stakes are so high for both 
the individual whose liberty is at risk and the community at large. However, the 
                                                        
46 Norman Fenton, Martin Neil and David A. Lagnado, ‘A General Structure for Legal Arguments 
About Evidence Using Bayesian Networks’ [2012] Cognitive Science 1.  
47 Cohen (n 34). 
48 A. P. Dawid, ‘The Difficulty About Conjunction’ (1987) 36 The Statistician 91.  
49 Id. 
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method has found use in such (equally important) tasks as diagnosing particular 
medical conditions on the basis of the patient’s symptoms, determining the requisite 
strength of a proposed structure, in light of the probability of extreme weather events, 
and countless others.50 If anything, the serious consequences of the decisions involved 
provides further justification for the application of the method, in order to enable 
judges, with all of their inherent human fallibilities in reasoning processes, to improve 
the quality of their decision-making and to challenge some of the common pitfalls that 
can arise when reasoning is left solely to the limits of human capacity.51  
A key point on the applicability of the theorem to any criminal trial ought to be made 
at this juncture. This is that the method categorically does not tell a judge or juror 
what the ‘right decision’ is to be. As is illustrated by the example below, the 
application of Bayes’ theorem relies on the individual decision-maker quantifying 
prior probabilities based on their own intuition.52 Thus, ‘any resulting inferences of 
probative value extracted from Bayes nets can only be as good, or as bad, as the initial 
human inputs’. 53  The reader should avoid the temptation to believe that the 
application of the method results in incontestability, or correctness, of the ultimate 
probabilities that result.54 Bayes Nets should be seen as a tool to assist thinking; they 
should not be viewed as a substitute to that thinking. 55 
II. Case study: Prosecutor v. Krnojelac 
 
Bayes Nets are closely related to another form of graphic representation of the 
complex inter-relationships between pieces of evidence, inferences and 
generalizations in criminal trials, the Wigmore chart, or ‘Wigmorean analysis’.56 The 
main difference between the two methods is that the Wigmore chart does not attach 
                                                        
50 Roberts and Aitken (n 30).  
51 For a similar argument, see McDermott (n 5).  
52 Roberts and Aitken (n 30), 104.  
53 Id.  
54  Craig R. Callen, ‘Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of Bayesian Theory in 
Evidence Law’ (1982) 57 Indiana Law Journal 1.  
55 For a similar point on Wigmorean analysis, see McDermott (n 5), 519. 
56 John Henry Wigmore, The Principles of Judicial Proof as given by Logic, Psychology, and General 
Experience, and Illustrated in Judicial Trials (Little Brown & Co., 1913). For a contemporary 
application of the method, see, inter alia, Terence Anderson, William Twining and David Schum, 
Analysis of Evidence (2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); David A. Schum, The 
Evidential Foundations of Probabilistic Reasoning (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 
2010) 167. 
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any value or weight to the individual or to related items of evidence that are 
pictorially represented, whereas the Bayes Net expressly represents the probabilities 
of a variety of outcomes.57  
 
Given this close relationship, if a Wigmore chart has already been prepared for a 
particular part of a case, it represents an excellent starting point for identifying the 
potential nodes of a Bayes Net. In our example, part of a Wigmore chart prepared by 
McDermott58 formed the basis of a study of Bayes Nets prepared by Aitken. The 
ultimate probandum in this inquiry was point 2 in the larger chart – namely, that 
Krnojelac knew that Halim Konjo was murdered by guards in the KP Dom detention 
facility where the accused was commander.  
 
The relevant part of the chart is as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A subset of a Wigmore chart for Krnojelac 
 
The related key list is:  
 
2  Krnojelac knew of murder of Halim Konjo by KP Dom guards.  
                                                        
57 Roberts and Aitken (n 30), 111.  
58 Published in McDermott (n 5).  
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3. Halim Konjo was murdered by KP Dom guards. 
4. Halim Konjo was taken away by KP Dom guards on 12 June 1992 and was 
never seen again. 
5.  Testimony of FWS-69; RJ; FWS-139; FWS-54 to 4. 
6.  Halim Konjo succumbed to a beating and died. 
7. Testimony of FWS-69; RJ; FWS-139; FWS-54 to 6. 
8. Halim Konjo died of a heart attack or stroke. 
9. Hearsay testimony of Muhamed Lisica to 8. 
10. Krnojelac knew that Halim Konjo was dead.  
11. Testimony of Krnojelac and RJ to 10.  
 
In Wigmore charting, arrows pointing to a node signify that the connected node tends 
to prove that node, whereas arrows pointing away from the node lead to a node that 
tends to disprove it. The Bayes Net presented here in Figure 2 is only loosely based 
on the Wigmore chart in Figure 1, which forms the basis for a Bayes Net but no more. 
Seven nodes were selected to represent the evidence of the section of the Wigmore 
diagram illustrated in Figure 1. They are described in Table 1. Each node was chosen 
to be binary in that two, and only two, possible outcomes were considered for each 
node. For example, the possible outcomes for node K, representing K’s knowledge, 
were taken to be that he was murdered or that he died of natural causes. The 
possibilities that he died in an accident or committed suicide were not considered 
here, though such alternatives could be considered with a straightforward extension of 
the procedure.  
 
The network in Figure 2 arose from the considerations of the evidence of six nodes 
and one node (node K) to represent the ultimate probandum (the ultimate issue to be 
proved), with corresponding descriptions in Table 1. Table 1 describes the nodes, 
their binary outcomes and the associated conditional probabilities. A subsequent 
narrative provides a justification for the choices of the probabilities. The testimonies 
of FWS_69, RJ, FWS_139 and FWS_54 are taken to be dependent on (a) K’s 
knowledge (whether he knew or did not know of the murder of HK), and (b) the 
testimony of RJ as to whether K talked, or did not talk, with RJ about the causes of 
death of HK. Of course, testimony is fallible, and on occasion, we assigned lower 
probability to a point outlined in testimony where we thought that point seemed 
unlikely. This is outlined in the narrative below Table 1, outlining the reasoning 
behind the assigned probabilities therein.  
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Figure 2: Bayes net for relationships amongst seven nodes as described in Table 1. 
Table 1: Node labels, a description of the nodes with their outcomes and associated 
conditional probabilities 
 
Node Label Description Outcomes Probabilities required Probs. 
K for 
Krnojelac 
(ultimate 
probandum) 
Knowledge 
K had of 
murder of 
HK 
K knew of 
murder of HK. 
 
K did not 
know of 
murder of HK. 
These probabilities are not 
important. They form the prior 
odds. Propagation of evidence 
throughout the network 
provides posterior odds. The 
ratio of prior to posterior odds 
is the likelihood ratio.  
0.50 
 
 
 
0.50 
TK1 Testimony 
of K, part 1 
Heard HK 
committed 
suicide. 
 
Did not hear 
HK committed 
suicide. 
1. Pr(Heard HK 
committed suicide 
given K knew of 
murder) 
 
2. Pr(Heard HK 
committed suicide 
given K did not know 
of murder) 
 
0.20 
 
 
 
 
0.90 
 
TK2 Testimony 
of K, part 2 
Told RJ that 
HK committed 
suicide. 
 
 
Did not tell RJ 
that HK 
committed 
suicide 
1. Pr(Told RJ that HK 
committed suicide 
given (a) TK1 (K) 
heard HK committed 
suicide and given (b) 
K knew of murder) 
 
2. Pr(Told RJ that HK 
committed suicide 
given (a) TK1 (K) 
heard HK committed 
suicide and given (b) 
K did not know of 
0.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.80 
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murder) 
 
3. Pr(Told RJ that HK 
committed suicide 
given (a) TK1 (K) did 
not hear that HK 
committed suicide and 
given (b) K knew of 
murder) 
 
 
4. Pr(Told RJ that HK 
committed suicide 
given (a) TK1 (K) did 
not hear that HK 
committed suicide and 
given (b) K did not 
know of murder) 
 
 
 
 
0.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.10 
 
FWS_69 Testimony 
of FWS_69 
RJ told 
FWS_69 that 
K had told him 
that HK had 
died in solitary 
confinement 
 
 
RJ did not tell 
FWS_69 that 
K had told him 
that HK had 
died in solitary 
confinement 
1. Pr(RJ told FWS_69 
that K had told him 
that HK had died in 
solitary confinement 
given (a) that K knew 
of murder and given 
(b) K refused to talk 
about cause of death of 
HK with RJ) 
 
2. Pr(RJ told FWS_69 
that K had told him 
that HK had died in 
solitary confinement 
given (a) that K did 
not know of murder 
and given (b) K 
refused to talk about 
cause of death of HK 
with RJ) 
 
3. Pr(RJ told FWS_69 
that K had told him 
that HK had died in 
solitary confinement 
given (a) that K knew 
of murder and given 
(b) K talked about 
cause of death of HK 
with RJ) 
0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.80 
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4. Pr(RJ told FWS_69 
that K had told him 
that HK had died in 
solitary confinement 
given (a) that K did 
not know of murder 
and given (b) K talked 
about cause of death of 
HK with RJ) 
 
 
0.90 
RJ Testimony 
of RJ  
K refused to 
discuss death 
of HK with 
him. 
 
K discussed 
death of HK 
with him 
1. Pr(K refused to discuss 
death of HK with RJ 
given (a) that K knew 
of murder and given 
(b) K told RJ that HK 
committed suicide) 
 
2. Pr(K refused to discuss 
death of HK with RJ 
given (a) that K did 
not know of murder 
and given (b) K told 
RJ that HK committed 
suicide) 
 
3. Pr(K refused to discuss 
death of HK with RJ 
given (a) that K knew 
of murder and given 
(b) K did not tell RJ 
that HK committed 
suicide) 
 
4. Pr(K refused to discuss 
death of HK with RJ 
given (a) that K did 
not know of murder 
and given (b) K did 
not tell RJ that HK 
committed suicide) 
0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.80 
 
FWS_139  Testimony 
of 
FWS_139 
RJ told 
FWS_139 that 
K had told him 
that HK had 
died as result 
of beatings 
 
 
RJ did not tell 
1. Pr(RJ told FWS_139 
that K had told him 
that HK had died in 
solitary confinement 
given (a) that K knew 
of murder and given 
(b) K refused to 
discuss death of HK 
with RJ) 
0.10 
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FWS_139 that 
K had told him 
that HK had 
died as result 
of beatings 
 
2. Pr(RJ told FWS_139 
that K had told him 
that HK had died in 
solitary confinement 
given (a) that K did 
not know of murder 
and given (b) K 
refused to discuss 
death of HK with RJ) 
 
3. Pr(RJ told FWS_139 
that K had told him 
that HK had died in 
solitary confinement 
given a) that K knew 
of murder and given 
(b) K discussed death 
of HK with RJ) 
 
4. Pr(RJ told FWS_139 
that K had told him 
that HK had died in 
solitary 
 
0.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.90 
 
 
 
 
FWS_54 Testimony 
of FWS_54 
RJ told 
FWS_54 that 
K had told him 
that HK had 
died as result 
of beatings. 
 
RJ did not tell 
FWS_54 that 
K had told him 
that HK had 
died as result 
of beatings 
1. Pr(RJ told FWS_54 
that K had told him 
that HK had died in 
solitary confinement 
given (a) that K knew 
of murder and given 
(b) K refused to 
discuss death of HK 
with RJ) 
 
2. Pr(RJ told FWS_54 
that K had told him 
that HK had died in 
solitary confinement 
given (a) that K did 
not know of murder 
and given (b) K 
refused to discuss 
death of HK with RJ) 
 
3. Pr(RJ told FWS_54 
that K had told him 
that HK had died in 
solitary confinement 
given (a) that K knew 
0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.80 
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of murder and given 
(b) K discussed death 
of HK with RJ) 
 
4. Pr(RJ told FWS_54 
that K had told him 
that HK had died in 
solitary confinement 
given (a) that K did 
not know of murder 
and given (b) K 
discussed death of HK 
with RJ) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.90 
 
 
 
It is important to note that no significance need be attached to the probabilities 
assigned initially to node K. These are prior probabilities and their ratio is the prior 
odds in favour of murder. With equal prior probabilities (both equal to 0.5), the prior 
odds are 1. Once evidence is set and propagated through the network, the probabilities 
for K are changed and become posterior probabilities. The ratio of posterior 
probabilities is the posterior odds in favour of murder and its value is proportional to 
the prior odds. The likelihood ratio is the ratio of posterior odds to prior odds. The 
prior odds have been chosen here to be equal to one. This is for numerical 
convenience. With prior odds of 1, the likelihood ratio is equal to the posterior odds. 
 
If the prior odds are different from one, chosen to be equal to a constant m say, then 
the posterior odds are changed also by a factor of m. When their ratio is taken, the 
constant m cancels and the resultant likelihood ratio is independent of m. The 
conditional probabilities required are determined by the structure of the network. For 
example, node TK2 has two arrows entering it, one from TK1 and one from K. Thus 
conditional probabilities for TK2 are required for the four possible combinations of 
conditioning events as listed in Table 1. 
 
The authors agreed upon the probabilities for the conditioning events listed in Table 1 
for the reasons set out below. If a reader were to disagree with any of the below 
probabilities, the figures could be very easily modified in the software, and new 
posterior probabilities could be calculated on that basis.  
 
Narrative for probabilities in Table 1: 
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TK1 = If K knew of the murder of HK, it is not very likely that he heard that the 
cause of death of HK was suicide from one of the guards; hence the event is given a 
probability of 0.2. It is much more likely (probability 0.9) that he would have heard 
that the cause of death was suicide if he had not known of the murder. 
TK2 = It is assumed that the probability assigned to TK2 cannot be higher than the 
probability assigned for TK1. If K knew of the murder, it is unlikely (probability 0.2) 
that he told RJ it was suicide, especially if he had heard this from someone else and 
yet knew it was murder. It is more likely (probability 0.8) that he would have told RJ 
this if he heard that it was suicide and he did not know it was murder and believed it 
to be suicide. 
If K knew of the murder and had not heard that HK had committed suicide, he may 
have told RJ it was suicide anyway (even if he had not heard this from elsewhere), as 
an excuse not to tell RJ the truth (probability 0.4). It is less likely (probability 0.1) that 
he would have said this if he had not heard that HK had committed suicide and, not 
knowing of the murder, had nothing to hide.  
FWS_69, 54 and 139 =The probability that RJ told these witnesses that K told him 
HK died in solitary confinement is low (0.1), if K refused to talk about the cause of 
death with RJ and K knew it was murder. It depends what is meant by ‘discussed’ – K 
could have told RJ that HK died in solitary confinement, but still have refused to 
discuss the death (i.e. talk about the cause of death). The probability of this event is 
also low but not so low (hence probability 0.2) if K did not know of the murder and 
refused to talk about the cause of death. Regardless of the cause of death 
(murder/suicide/stroke) and K’s knowledge of the same, the probability that K told RJ 
that HK died in solitary confinement is high (0.8), if he was willing to discuss the 
death with RJ. It would be a higher probability (0.9) if he knew of the murder but 
discussed the death with RJ 
RJ = The probability that K refused to discuss the death with RJ is very low (0.05) 
given that K knew of the murder and told RJ that HK committed suicide. Again, this 
depends on what is meant by ‘discuss’. Our reading of the transcripts suggest that 
when the term ‘discuss’ is used, it means any discussion, however brief, and would 
also include cause of death. It is more likely (probability 0.95) that K did not discuss 
the death if he did not tell RJ of cause of death and also if he knew of murder.  
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There is a lower probability (0.8) that, if K did not know of the murder, that he would 
not discuss the death with RJ, as presumably he would wish to find out more. Less 
likely still is the suggestion, found only in K’s own testimony, that he did not know of 
the murder but that he told RJ that HK committed suicide. The probability of this is 
0.2. It is somewhat higher than the first probability in this section of the table – the 
probability that K refused to discuss the death with RJ given that he knew of the 
murder and that he told RJ that HK committed suicide – because that element is 
internally inconsistent (it would be close to impossible for K both to tell RJ that the 
cause of death was suicide and to refuse to discuss the cause of death). Despite the 
same inconsistencies in the element to which a probability of 0.2 attaches, the 
probability here is slightly higher because of the support provided by the conditioning 
elements. RJ’s testimony, which stated that K refused to discuss the death with him, is 
conditioned on K not knowing of the murder and K telling RJ that HK had committed 
suicide.  
For each event in Table 1 for which a probability is requested there is a 
complementary event for which the probability is known, once the probability 
requested is given. Two events are complementary if they are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive; their probabilities add up to one. For example, for node FWS_54 and the 
probability that RJ told FWS_54 that K had told him that HK had died in solitary 
confinement given (a) that K knew of murder and given (b) K refused to discuss 
death of HK with RJ), the complementary event is “RJ did not tell FWS_54 that K 
had told him that HK had died in solitary confinement given (a) that K knew of 
murder and given (b) K refused to discuss death of HK with RJ”. The probability of 
the complementary event is {1 - Pr(RJ told FWS_54 that K had told him that HK had 
died in solitary confinement given that K knew of murder and K refused to discuss 
death of HK with RJ)}. 
 
In practice, the choice of probabilities can be very subjective and may be fraught with 
difficulties. The probabilities are best chosen in a consultation involving a subject 
expert and the statistician, as was the case with the example presented above. The 
advantage of the Bayes Net is that the effect of choices on the probability of the 
ultimate probandum ‘K knew of murder of HK’ can be investigated very quickly. The 
procedure has the considerable benefit that it is transparent and is easy to discuss in 
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court. If the procedure is challenged in court, then the expert witness (a subject expert 
or statistician) will be expected to justify the choice. If a different choice is suggested, 
say, by a judge or counsel, then it is a simple matter to investigate the effect of that 
choice on the likelihood ratio for the ultimate probandum (that HK was murdered in 
this example). 
 
It may be that the subject expert is unhappy about the use of numbers to represent 
their measure of belief. In such a situation, it is possible to use verbal descriptors and 
then convert these to numbers for input to the network. For example, the descriptors 
(extremely likely, very likely, likely, equally likely, unlikely, very unlikely, extremely 
unlikely) could be converted to (0.95, 0.9, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3. 0.1, 0.05). Such a conversion 
from a verbal scale to a numerical scale is not ideal but is better than not doing it. 
 
The conversion of a verbal scale to a numerical scale can also operate in the reverse 
direction. Given a numerical value for a likelihood ratio, a verbal equivalent is used. 
The European Network of Forensic Science Institutes has provided some guidelines 
for evaluative reporting in forensic science.59 The guidelines suggest the following 
verbal equivalents: 
 1 < LR ≤10 provides slight or limited support for the first proposition against 
the alternative; 
 10 < LR ≤ 100: moderate support; 
 100 < LR ≤ 1000: moderately strong support; 
 1000 < LR ≤ 10000: strong support; 
 LR > 10000: very strong support. 
 
Once the network and the associated probabilities have been established, it is possible 
to investigate the support certain pieces of evidence may have for the ultimate 
probandum, whether K knew or did not know of the murder. This investigation may 
appear to be one that benefits from hindsight. The evidence is known before the 
                                                        
59 ENFSI Guideline for Evaluative Reporting in Forensic Science: Strengthening the Evaluation of 
Forensic Strengthening the Evaluation of Forensic Results across Europe (STEOFRAE) Results across 
Europe (STEOFRAE), March 2015, 17, available online at: 
http://enfsi.eu/sites/default/files/documents/external_publications/m1_guideline.pdf (last accessed 20 
July 2016).  
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network is constructed. However, what is not known is the overall strength of the 
support provided by the evidence in total for the ultimate probandum for the evidence.  
 
The construction of the network requires an assumption that the investigators can 
make subjective judgements of conditional probabilities for small groups of nodes, no 
more than three nodes in a group in the network in Figure 2. The application of the 
software can then inform the investigators of the overall strength of the support based 
on their inputted conditional probabilities. It is also possible to conduct a sensitivity 
analysis of the change in support for the ultimate probandum based on changes in the 
values of the initial conditional probabilities. 
 
The likelihood ratio in favour of the proposition that K knew of the murder of HK 
provided by certain evidence is given in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2. The likelihood ratio (LR) in favour of the proposition that K knew of the 
murder of HK provided by certain evidence. Likelihood ratios in normal font are 
support for the proposition that K knew of the murder of HK, those in italic font are 
support for the proposition that K did not know of the murder of HK. Likelihood 
ratios are given to one decimal place. The node or nodes specified in the column 
headed ‘Node’ are those for which evidence has been instantiated. No evidence is 
known for those nodes not specified. 
 
Index Node Evidence LR 
1 TK1 K heard HK had committed suicide 4.5 
2 TK1 K did not hear that HK had committed suicide 8.0 
3 TK2 K told RJ that HK had committed suicide 2.0 
4 TK2 K did not tell RJ that HK had committed suicide 2.4 
5 TK1, 
TK2 
K heard HK had committed suicide and that he told RJ that HK 
had committed suicide 
18.0 
6 TK1, 
TK2 
K heard HK had committed suicide and that he did not tell RJ that 
HK had committed suicide 
1.1 
7 TK1, 
TK2 
K did not hear that HK had committed suicide and that he told RJ 
that HK had committed suicide 
32.0 
8 TK1, 
TK2 
K did not hear that HK had committed suicide and that he did not 
tell RJ that HK had committed suicide 
5.3 
9 RJ  K refused to discuss death of HK with RJ 1.7 
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10 RJ K discussed death of HK with RJ 1.7 
11 FWS-
69, 
FWS-
139, 
FWS-
54 
All three were told by RJ that K had told him that HK had died in 
solitary confinement 
2.4 
12 Two were told by RJ that K had told him that HK had died in 
solitary confinement, one was not told by RJ that K had told him 
that HK had died in solitary confinement 
1.2 
13 One was told by RJ that K had told him that HK had died in 
solitary confinement, two were not told by RJ that K had told him 
that HK had died in solitary confinement 
1.2 
14 All three were not told by RJ that K had told RJ that HK had died 
in solitary confinement 
2.5 
 
 
A sensitivity analysis of the effect of changes in the conditional probabilities for node 
TK1 on the likelihood ratio (support) for the proposition that K knew of the murder of 
HK is given in Table 3 below. Note that the values for the LR in the lower triangular 
part of the table are the reciprocal of the values in the upper triangular part of the 
table. The value for the LR on the diagonal is one as the evidence is neutral when the 
probability that K testified that he had heard that HK committed suicide, given he 
knew of the murder of HK is equal to the probability that K testified that he had heard 
that HK committed suicide, given he did not know of the murder of HK. The 
likelihood ratios are not very large as only one piece of evidence is under 
consideration. 
 
Table 3. The likelihood ratios (LR) in favour of the proposition that K knew of the 
murder of HK for various conditional probabilities for the testimony that K had heard 
that HK had committed suicide. The conditioning events are (a) that K knew of the 
murder and (b) that K did not know of the murder. The conditional probabilities range 
from 0.2 to 0.9. Likelihood ratios in normal font are support for the proposition that K 
knew of the murder of HK, those in italic font are support for the proposition that K 
did not know of the murder of HK. Likelihood ratios are given to one decimal place.  
 
Likelihood ratios Probability K heard HK had committed suicide given that K 
knew of the murder of HK 
Probability  0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
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K heard that 
HK had 
committed 
suicide 
given that K 
did not 
know of the 
murder of 
HK 
0.2 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 
0.3 1.5 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.0 2.3 2.7 3.0 
0.4 2.0 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.2 
0.5 2.5 1.7 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 
0.6 3.0 2.0 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.5 
0.7 3.5 2.3 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.3 
0.8 4.0 2.7 2.0 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.1 
0.9 4.5 3.0 2.2 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.0 
 
Now consider the support for the ultimate probandum if all other nodes have evidence 
instantiated. Two cases are given, one in which all nodes are set at the first level and 
one in which all nodes are set at the second level. The initial probabilities are set at 
the values given in Table 1. A full investigation of the effect on the ultimate 
probandum of the different possible instantiations would require 26 = 64 
combinations. 
 
The first case, in which all nodes are set to the first level, has the following evidence: 
 
1. K heard HK had committed suicide; 
2. K told RJ that HK had committed suicide; 
3. RJ told FWS_69 that K had told him that HK had died in solitary 
confinement; 
4. RJ told FWS_139 that K had told him that HK had died in solitary 
confinement; 
5. RJ told FWS_54 that K had told him that HK had died in solitary 
confinement; 
6. K refused to discuss the death of HK with RJ. 
 
For this set of evidence, the likelihood ratio is 96.0 in support of the proposition that 
K did not know of the murder of HK. Using the verbal scale above, this means that 
there is moderate support for the proposition that K was unaware of the murder of 
HK. The ICTY Trial Chamber ultimately concluded that the evidence failed to prove, 
beyond reasonable doubt, that K was aware of the murder of HK, 60  and the 
calculations here, based on our initial probabilities, show that this conclusion was 
well-founded. 
                                                        
60 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Judgment, Case No. IT-97-25-T, 15 March 2002, para. 348.  
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The second case, in which all nodes are set to the second level, has the following 
evidence: 
1. K did not hear that HK had committed suicide; 
2. K did not tell RJ that HK had committed suicide; 
3. RJ did not tell FWS_69 that K had told him that HK had died in solitary 
confinement; 
4. RJ did not tell FWS_139 that K had told him that HK had died in solitary 
confinement; 
5. RJ did not tell FWS_54 that K had told him that HK had died in solitary 
confinement; 
6. K discussed the death of HK with RJ. 
 
For this set of evidence, the likelihood ratio is 1.1 in support of the proposition that K 
did know of the murder of HK. A value this close to 1 is effectively neutral, thus this 
combination of testimony provides no support for either proposition. It is 
disappointing that this combination of evidence, set of testimonies, does not provide 
more definitive support for one proposition than the other. However, the outcome 
provides an example of the benefit of the network. With our selection of initial 
conditional probabilities, the overall evidence is neutral. Again, this shows that the 
ICTY’s refusal to enter a finding, beyond reasonable doubt, that Krnojelac knew of 
the murder was well-founded.  
Conclusion 
This article argued that the use of Bayes Nets by various actors in international 
criminal trials, and an understanding of the fundamentals of probability by such 
actors, would enhance the quality of fact-finding in international criminal law. This 
argument is situated in a wider context on the reliability of findings of fact in 
international criminal law. Whilst many authors have pointed to challenges to fact-
finding in the context of international criminal trials, and to particular findings of fact 
that are not supported by the evidence at hand, few have provided practical solutions 
to these issues. Even fewer have illustrated how formal methods and tools to assist 
decision-making could be used in practice. 
By providing a practical example of the process of devising a Bayes Net from an 
international criminal case, we have illustrated how one such method could be used in 
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practice by international criminal judges, their staff, and by prosecution and defence 
counsel. Our small exploratory study focused on a limited part of the Krnojelac Trial 
Judgment.  It is pleasing to note that our analysis agreed with the ICTY’s findings on 
this charge. An ideal use of the Bayes Net would be to incorporate all the evidence in 
one network. This may appear an unachievable ideal but it may be as achievable as a 
thorough study of all the evidence by any other way, given the quantity and 
complexity of the evidence. Any attempt to construct a Bayes Net would concentrate 
minds on which nodes (pieces of evidence), which links (associations amongst pieces 
of evidence) and probability values (strengths of association) to include in the 
consideration of the judgement. 
We hope, in this article, to have illustrated the relative ease of applying the method to 
a complex factual and evidential matrix, in spite of the objections that may be levelled 
against the use of Bayes Nets, as noted in Part I. With the availability of software to 
construct Bayes Nets, the otherwise complex task of calculating revised probabilities 
becomes straightforward, even for cases that are as complex as international criminal 
cases, and despite the quite unique evidential hurdles faced in international criminal 
trials. With a small amount of training, judges and lawyers, practicing in all areas of 
law, would be able to incorporate this methodology into their practice. This article has 
shown the utility of the methodology and illustrated how it might work in practice.  
